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1. Introduction     
The techno-cultural developments that are globally re-weaving us within satellite 
communication networks, the Internet, and the world wide web have also given us 
cyberspace, virtual reality, and hyper-text as new fabrics of culture-space-reality interaction. 
Coupled with an exponential growth in technological advances has been a similar 
mushrooming of cultural fantasies about altogether different futures.  
The adjectives cyber, virtual, and hyper are meant to serve as the markers of this altogether 
different future, its different and other space/reality/textile. Even a traditional, calendarical 
distinction like a "new" millennium is infused with a magical substance by such references. 
We were excited about, and also scared from, the new millennium because it was supposed 
to mark the passage from the repetitive and familiar traditions and constraints or securities 
of the "old" to the "new" of this altogether different future. The reactions engendered by this 
excitement are Janus-faced, or, for those who are more familiar with the Batman mythology, 
two-faced, like the character played by Tommy Lee Jones who is called, simply, Two-Face, 
in the movie Batman Forever. Like another famous literary character, Robert Louis 
Stevenson’s Dr. Jeykll and Mr. Hyde, Two-Face has both an evil and a good “face,” and 
decides to do good or bad based upon the result of a coin flip. Similarly, our reactions to 
these developments are two-faced and contradictory in that we are both excited and scared, 
we lay out the welcome mat and start building and reinforcing the retaining wall, we feel 
both attracted and repulsed towards these developments. In the vast orientalist literature, 
for instance, the Orient is depicted both as an uncivilized, backward place ruled by despotic 
rulers, lacking freedom, and whose characteristics are the very opposite of what “we” in the 
West value and uphold, and yet also as an exotic place of attraction, attractive in its 
exoticism, both sexualized and found sexually attractive, where one can indulge beyond the 
reach of the restraints back “home” (See Fig. 1). 
There is something of the unknown about them which triggers these reactions. Like the terra 
incognita of the Europeans during the “Age of Conquest and Discovery,” cyberspace, virtual 
reality, and hypertext represent, in one of their guises, the freedom to break from the restraints 
of “our” known world, the source of much excitement. I find it significant that a very 
important US “civil liberties group defending [our] rights in the digital world” is called the 
“Electronic Frontier Foundation.” The reference here is, of course, to the rapidly expanding 
                                                 
1 A shorter, earlier version of this chapter was published in Open House International V32, N1, 83-88, 0168-2601. 
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frontier separating the young United States from “the Wild West,” which was indeed a source 
of excitement, and represented boundless freedom to those who were part of this Westward 
expansion. By partaking in this boundless freedom, they were doing good, naturally, or so 
they thought. But to the natives, this exercise of freedom was sheer hell, wiping their land, 
their culture, and their freedom to write their own destiny as peoples with distinct identities—
and not just as the exotic backdrop of Wild West shows, and later, movies—out of existence.  
 
 
Fig. 1. The “Orient”—old and new—as an exotic place of attraction, both sexualized and  
and found sexually attractive. 
Just as the Age of Conquest and Discovery had ushered in the age of colonialism and 
(capitalist) imperialism, bringing told and untold misery, including slavery, to many peoples 
around the world who were deemed inferior, less than human, and uncivilized with the help 
of highly cultivated Eurocentric lenses, this “old” story was repeated in the expansion of the 
“new” frontier in the US. And in these cases, we don’t even have to wait for the delay of a 
coin-flip, or the nightfall after the day ends, for the evil “face” to show up. The “good” 
characters can, it seems, do evil in the very act of doing good. The evil other is not only there 
lurking in the shadows waiting for his/her turn after the good one, but is there at the same 
time. The self is thus divided both spatially and temporally, and cannot become self-identical 
in any fully final sense. So maybe, what we are led to see as our opposite other over there, may 
turn out to be mixed up with what is in us here, with what is familiar. We may recall, in this 
regard, a slogan from the anti-Vietnam war struggles in the US, which said, “we have seen the 
enemy, and it is us.” In fact, is not “the external other over there” one such familiar story, but a 
story with a strange unfamiliarity, which we cannot quite place, within it? In the early 
European maps of the world, drawn during the age of discovery, their terra incognita, the 
undiscovered and unknown land, was depicted as populated by supposedly unfamiliar 
monster creatures, such as dragons, feeding into the peoples’ fear of the unknown.  However, 
these creatures drawn at the edges of their known world on those maps were not creatures 
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emanating from the unknown, but they were, rather, the fantastic creations of the Europeans 
themselves. Thus, their very recognizability as monsters made these creatures familiar and 
homely. As the critique of orientalism made abundantly clear (Said, 1979), these fantastic 
European creations were subsequently projected onto the “lands of discovery.” 
In this chapter, taking the above observations as my lead, I engage with the question of the 
otherness of cyberspace, virtual reality, and hypertext, and how they are distinguished as 
"new" and altogether different. I pose the question: Are cyberspace/virtual 
reality/hypertext the opposite others of space/reality/text or are they, rather, the latter's 
iterable and itered rearticulation and retranscription? 
2. The Modernist othering of cyberspace, virtual reality and hypertext 
It is the novelty of cyberspace, virtual reality, and hypertext that feeds both the idolatry and 
the demonization or the excitement and the fear we feel towards them. They are new and 
modern (some would say postmodern) creations. Modern, as it is commonly construed, is a 
culturally biased, more specifically Euro- or West-centric, teleological concept, representing 
the telos of History understood as an unstoppable progressive movement from the old of the 
past to the new of the now, as commonly depicted in the replacement of the old year by the 
new on the eve of the new year. For the new to be new, it must be radically different from the 
old, giving it the aura of the unknown, and it is this aspect that feeds all the cultural fantasies, 
both anticipatory and fearful, about cyberspace, virtual reality, and hypertext. 
We could begin by noting how this "new" future is distinguished by familiar binary 
oppositions like future vs. past and modern vs. traditional. They rely on the notion of a new 
that is uncontaminated by the old. Indeed, that is what the designation "modern" stands for. 
It is the modernist imaginary of a unilinear time, animated by a Eurocentric telos, that 
defines our opposites of the (advanced) modern and the (backward) traditional. Jacques 
Derrida (1982) refers to this mode of thought as a logocentric metaphysics of presence, 
which, in trying to banish its own difference or otherness inside, projects it onto a binary 
oppositional outside; he further specifies it as „Western“ metaphysics, referring to „the 
activation of what is called Western thought, the thought whose destiny is to extend its 
domains while the boundaries of the West are drawn back“ (1978, p.4), and as „the white 
mythology which reassembles and reflects the culture of the West“ (1982, p. 213). Hence, its 
structure and operations are familiar. As Edward Said (1979) and others after him have 
shown, positioning oneself as an Oriental does not overcome the sovereignty of this Western 
metaphysics, since the founding reference of the Orient, the reference by which it is 
identified, is the Occident. Its binary oppositional makeup means that it cannot be opposed 
by a binary opposition, which rather sustains it. Derrida poses the problem of the 
ethnocentrism of this „Western metaphysics“ from some of his earliest writings (1978, pp. 
278-293, 1976 p. 4, 101-140). Much of postcolonial theory is informed by this critique. 
As the modernist imaginary led to and was shaped historically by a series of revolutions in 
Europe, the notion of "revolution" is used as the exemplary marker of a clean break from the 
pre-modern past. Thus, the French Revolution of 1789 was supposed to mark a clean break 
with the absolutism of the Anciént Regime; similarly, the Turkish Republic, representing such 
a revolutionary break, was supposed to have nothing to do with its less-than-civilized 
Ottoman past; we even talked and wrote about "epistemological breaks" that marked the 
leaving behind of old problematics or paradigms. Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar 
(1970), for instance, argue that Karl Marx’s thought is fundamentally incompatible with its 
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antecedents because of its ground-breaking epistemology. Likewise, Thomas Kuhn (1970) 
theorizes scientific advancement not in terms of a cumulative acquisition of knowledge, but 
in terms of intellectually violent revolutions in which one paradigm, a conceptual 
worldview, is left behind and is replaced by another. The primary reason for these 
intellectual revolutions is that paradigms are conceptualized as incompatible, or rather as 
„incommensurable“ with each other.  
In the orientalist mapping of the modernist imaginary, the Occident and the Orient were 
likewise defined in terms of an (external) ontological difference: as Rudyard Kipling put it in 
British colonial India, "O, East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet" 
(quoted in Harlow & Carter, 1999, p. 207). Yet, this is precisely what is problematized in recent 
postcolonial and postmodern theory. Gayatri Spivak, for example, reminds us that such a 
categorical distinction ignores or tries to forget their inter-implicational existence throughout 
the past and ongoing history of imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. Emphasizing 
the “international division of labor,” Spivak (1988) draws our attention to the epistemic 
violence involved in the constitution of “the colonial subject as Other,” and warns us against 
buying into “a self contained representation of Europe,” as this ignores “its production by the 
imperialist project” (pp. 272, 280-281, 291). Elsewhere Spivak (1993) notes, “Europe’s ‘memory’ 
as itself has colonialism inscribed in it; keeping contemporary Europe ‘pure’ cannot escape 
that memory” (p. 113). Hence, the production and sustenance of both the sovereign-self and its 
other is dependent on their respective other. Their very being is inter-implicational, making 
them hybrid and excessive to any identification identified in terms of a binary opposition. 
In the modernist imaginary, however, the oppositions are seen as safely external to each 
other. The outside does not contaminate and creolize the imagined purity of the inside. 
Their identity as, for example, distinct periods or styles, is uncontaminated by internal 
difference, by hybridity, by alterity, by otherness, by each one's other. This imaginary is 
what leads us to write about unified and distinct periods, spaced and following each other, 
along a unilinear time scale. We read and write about the “Middle Ages” as a unified period 
that is characteristically, uniformly, categorically and thus totally in the “dark” compared to 
the “Enlightenment” yet to come, the handmaiden of modernity. The modern period is 
similarly imagined as a totalized unity in its characterization. This is in defiance of the very 
obvious presence of different others, styles, characteristics, figures, who do not properly 
"belong" in "our" modern period but whom we designate as belonging to a different period 
that then needs to be located in the temporal past of that unilinear, oppositional scale.  
Take the designation “backward” that is used routinely to characterize individuals, peoples, 
nations around the world. Those characterized as backward, are then seen and understood as 
belonging not to the present time but to the past—as measured on the modernist unilinear, 
oppositional scale, they are “back” in time—and thus, the past becomes their proper place and 
time of existence. They become like ghosts visiting from another time, which makes their 
presence in the present time of the modern a virtual one. As they are also actually existing, we 
could perhaps say that they are actu-virtual. Their actu-virtuality, their existence in “our” time, 
and not in “their” time, then becomes a problem, which is to say, they become a problem, to be 
dealt with by modern means and solutions ranging from expulsion from the ranks of 
humanity-proper to outright elimination.2 Let us not forget that the Nazi concentration camps 
                                                 
2 As an example of the rising tide of reactionary sentiments against immigrants and refugees around 
Europe, it was reported in the news recently that the French President Nicolas Sarkozy proposed to 
strip French nationality from those who commit certain crimes, particularly targeting foreign born 
nationals (Reuters 30 July 2010). 
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and the Holocaust are examples of “modern” solutions to this “problem.” Zygmunt Bauman 
(1996), for example, argues that the Holocaust is not exceptional, representing the acts of a 
madman, but that it is the logical outcome of modernist thinking. Similarly, Giorgio Agamben 
discusses “the Camp” as “the biopolitical paradigm of the modern” in his Homo Sacer: 
Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1988), and draws our attention to how the unusual extension of 
power under the pretext of “a state of emergency” or a “state of exception”—a notion whose 
main reference continues to be Carl Schmitt, who has been called the “the crown jurist of the 
Third Reich”—among Western powers after the attacks of 9/11, has the potential to transform 
democracies into totalitarian states in his State of Exception (2005). 
As the word modern means contemporary, those who claim modernity for themselves claim 
the present for themselves as well. It is their way of making themselves present—through 
such culturally specific representations involving an epistemic violence toward others. Thus, 
those who are deemed categorically different from "us" lose their claim to the present, and 
become essentially and epistemologically absent in the teleologically pre-sent time, despite 
their physical, material, and contemporary presence. That is why it is important to highlight 
the ethnocentrism, or more specifically the Euro- or West-centrism of the modernist 
imaginary and the epistemic violence that its ethnocentrism requires (Ilter, 1994). The 
history of colonialism and imperialism, and its neo- variants, is also the history of the 
attempt to “world” the world, that is to say, to reshape and reconfigure the world according 
to the dictates of this modernist imaginary.3 
In dealing with this epistemic violence, the least we can do is to note that these different others 
did not come to be in our present by traveling in a time machine from the past. Rather, they 
are our contemporaries who are epistemologically and representationally projected to the past 
by the modernist imaginary, by the modernist worlding of the world. They represent a 
difference within that does not add up to complete the full presence of the modern. On the 
contrary, their presence in the modern troubles our traditional and conventional conception of 
the modern as purely and fully self-present. Ironically, it is to save this traditional conception 
that the excessive difference of the modern, its difference-within, is projected to the modern's 
outside by means of an ethnocentric and epistemic violence. In other words, what is thereby 
represented as new and modern turns out to be traditional itself. The recognition of this 
difference-within without recourse to an epistemic violence—a prejudicial way of knowing 
that erases it from the inside of the present and projects it to the outside—requires a 
deconstructive, post-modern rearticulation of the modern. Provided we rethink the word 
"new," we could say that it requires a new way of understanding the modern. The "post" of 
this post-modern rearticulation, therefore, does not and cannot refer to another indifferent 
period following the modern one, for this vision of successive periods along a unilinear path is 
informed precisely by the modernist imaginary. If we recall that the word modern means 
contemporary, it becomes clear that one cannot post the modern that way, or to say it 
differently, posting the modern that way is perfectly modernist.4 Rather the post of post-
                                                 
3 I owe the phrase „worlding of the world“ to Gayatri Spivak (1988) who uses it in, among other places, 
„Can the Subaltern Speak?“ 
4 Hal Foster distinguishes between "a postmodernism that deconstructs modernism" and "a 
postmodernism which repudiates the former to celebrate the latter: a postmodernism of resistance and a 
postmodernism of reaction" (Foster, 1983, p. xi-xii). I am highlighting the modernist architecture of this 
latter "postmodernism of reaction." See also Jean-Franc ̧ois Lyotard who writes: "This idea of a linear 
chronology...in the sense of a simple succession, a diachronic sequence of periods in which each one is 
clearly identifiable...is itself perfectly 'modern'" (Lyotard, 1992, p. 76). 
www.intechopen.com
                                                                                                                                      Virtual Reality 
 
640 
modern refers us to the modern's excessive difference within that prevents its closure onto 
itself and which opens it to further becoming (Ilter, 1994, p. 57-58). This is necessary to prevent 
the canonization of modernism's own rebellion and thus the closure of its nascent 
incompleteness. As we shall see, this notion of openness, to becoming other and different, is 
precisely what is meant by virtuality. 
3. Binary oppositional reaction to cyberspace, virtual reality and hypertext 
The modernist worlding of the world leaves us with two opposing possibilities in greeting 
cyberspace, virtual reality, and hypertext. As cybertechnophile handmaidens of the future, we 
greet them as harbingers of a future that will singularly liberate us from the limits and 
constraints of our traditional past, so that our present will cease to be constrained by the past 
and will, instead, be shaped and guided by this new, after-the-break future. Accordingly, they 
represent "the technology of miracles and dreams," allowing us to "play God," in virtual reality 
where "we can make water solid, and solids fluid; we can imbue inanimate objects (chairs, 
lamps, engines) with an intelligent life of their own. We can invent animals, singing textures, 
clever colors or fairies." Virtual reality alone is greeted as "the hope for the next century" with 
the ability to "afford glimpses of heaven" (Sherman & Judkins, 1992, p. 126-7, 134). 
The euphoria afforded by this other, virtual existence rests on the promise of transcendence 
and liberation from our material and embodied existence in the here-and-now, providing 
access to an infinite, transcendent, and perfect other world. In Michael Benedict's words, 
"cyberspace is nothing more, or less, than the latest stage in [what Karl Popper designates 
as] World 3 [the world of objective, real and public structures which are the not-necessarily-
intentional products of the minds of living creatures] with the ballast of materiality cast 
away—cast away again, and perhaps finally" (Benedict, 2000, p. 31). This notion of freedom 
based on the transcendence of material and corporeal "constraints" conceives the relation 
between virtual- or cyberspace and real space as a relation of mind to body, and rests on the 
patriarchal, hierarchical privilege accorded to the mind in Western thought. The often heard 
sexist mantra, “women are emotional, men are rational,” is but one expression of this view 
which holds that women are trapped in their bodies and their sensual experience, whereas 
men are able to transcend it in the ideal world of thought. Plato held that material, 
embodied forms are flawed, and that truth was to be found in the realm of disembodied 
Ideas. Here the mental and the physical are clearly separated, and the above mentioned 
representation of cyberspace as “the intentional products of the minds of living creatures 
with the ballast of materiality cast away” follows this line of thought. This is ironic, in that 
what is touted as new, finally enabling us to cast materiality away, turns out to be not new 
but old. It repeats a very old understanding of the relation between mind and body, which 
construes that relationship as mind over body, and recycles it as new. 
What is also striking is that the projection of such utopian possibilities is not at all unique to 
cyberspace, virtual reality, and hypertext. Similar utopian promises and aspirations, as well 
as the fears, anxieties, and panics that I will discuss further down, have accompanied every 
major technological innovation since the Renaissance, and, perhaps more markedly, since 
the industrial revolution. Johan Gutenberg’s printing press, James Watt’s steam engine, the 
railway and its “iron horse”, and assembly line production based on Taylorist “scientific 
management” principles were all idolized—promising a wonderful new world full of 
possibilities not possible before—and demonized—fearful of the dangerous consequences—
at the same time, eliciting reactions of both kinds. The industrial revolution, and the techno-
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cultural innovations that brought it about, was welcomed by the capitalists as a fabulous 
means of gaining wealth. This was aided by ideologies of utilitarianism that called for the 
capitalists’ unimpeded pursuit of profit. This, however, brought about the deterioration of 
the working people’s lifestyles and standards of living. A number of Charles Dickens’ 
novels, including Oliver Twist, depict the horrible working conditions in the factories in 
Britain at the time. Thus, it is not surprising that to many working people, the machine 
symbolized submission to a regime that exploited and oppressed them. A well-known 
example of workers’ resistance to such exploitation comes from the so-called Luddites, who 
took their name from a Ned Ludd, and took to destroying mechanized looms used in the 
British textile industry in the early eighteen hundreds. The movement had grown so strong 
for a while that the Luddites clashed in battles with the British army.  
When we consider how similarly these earlier techno-cultural innovations were received 
compared with the contemporary examples discussed above, and further in this text, these 
make—in an ironical twist—the newness of the new computer-based technologies in 
question a part of a long-standing tradition. 
Regarding hypertext, for example, George Landow, writes, in a typically modernist fashion, 
of "a paradigm shift" that "marks a revolution in human thought" providing us with "a way 
into the contemporary episteme in the midst of major changes" (Landow, 1997, p. 2). 
Articulating the insights of designers of computer software like Theodor Nelson, who 
coined the word hypertext, and Andries van Dam with those of critical theorists like Roland 
Barthes and Jacques Derrida, Landow reaches the following understanding of their work: 
"All four...argue that we must abandon conceptual systems founded upon ideas of center, 
margin, hierarchy, and linearity and replace them with ones of multi-linearity, nodes, links, 
and networks" (Landow, 1997, p. 2). And yet, the commonality of their relationship is 
misconstrued here. These related notions of a revolution in human thought, involving a 
paradigm shift where old concepts are abandoned and left behind, and are replaced by new 
ones, are precisely what are put in question and not warranted in the works of Barthes and, 
especially, of Derrida—but they do fit the modernist framework outlined earlier. Derrida's 
deconstruction is not destruction (of the old, or of what is criticized). The critic is not located 
in some metaphysical outside, like God is supposed to be, but is rather located within, and 
as part of the very textile weave that s/he is critical of. All her critical resources, including 
the language of her criticism, are inheritances that s/he borrows from the very textile that is 
put in question. However, as Derrida puts it, inheritance is not a given but a task. In what he 
refers to as “iterability” (repeatability with a difference), what is repeated, the old, changes 
and becomes different than what it was previous to the repetition. Everything harbors an 
unconditional  secret that can never be fully and completely revealed, and is open to its own 
becoming different and other. This openness to a different future, always yet to come, this 
irreducible potential or secret, is what virtuality is about. By the same token deconstruction 
draws it power from the fact that things are always-already in deconstruction. Therefore, 
deconstruction is not an operation done by force on things from the outside. Hence, what is 
deconstructed is not erased or abandoned and replaced by something else entirely, in an 
operation of erasure or destruction, but is, rather, displaced from its privileged hierarchical 
position in the binary opposition by showing how it is indeed dependent and founded upon 
what it allegedly excludes and does not need. 
Continuing with the opposite end of the spectrum of responses to cyberspace, virtual reality, 
and hypertext, we see various nostalgic Luddite reactions against their growing influence and 
power, a growth that is seen today as threatening our humanity, liberty, and reason. 
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According to Arthur and Marilouise Kroker, "we are living in a decisive historical time: the era 
of the post-human" where "virtualization in the cyber- hands of the new technological class is 
all about our being dumbed down," thus preventing "a critical analysis of the public situation" 
whereby the human species is "humiliated" as the subject of digital culture; indeed, what "we 
are talking about [is] a systematic assault against the human species" involving "the harvesting 
of human flesh as (our) bodies and minds are reduced to a database for imaging systems" 
(Kroker & Kroker, 2000, p. 97- 98, 101-103). The Krokers' attempt to introduce ethical concerns 
regarding technological innovation is thus based on an apocalyptic vision of cyber or virtual 
reality. Similarly, Kevin Robins quotes approvingly Peter Weibel who describes virtuality and 
cyberspace as psychotic, "where the boundaries between wish and reality are blurred," and 
continues to mourn how in this "psychotic" space "the reality of the real world is disavowed; 
the coherence of the self deconstructed into fragments; and the quality of experience reduced 
to sensation and intoxication" (Robins, 1995, p. 143-144). Although not specifically about 
cyberspace, Stanley Aronowitz's discussion of computer mediated work points out how 
"many corporations have used [computers] to extend their panoptic worldview" and how 
"they have deployed the computer as a means of employee surveillance that far exceeds the 
most imperious dreams of the panopticon's inventor Jeremy Bentham" (Aronowitz, 1994, p. 
27). And indeed, we see many such examples around us.  
A friend and colleague who teaches there informs me that the mayor of Balçova, who placed 
surveillance cameras in this town near İzmir, Turkey, put up bilboards in the city a while 
ago, which said the Balçova residents need not worry (for their safety), for they are watched 
over round the clock. In the UK, there are reportedly more surveillance cameras per person 
than in any other country in the world (Lewis, 2009). In London alone there are reportedly 
more than 500 000 cameras at work (Wall Street Journal, July 8, 2005). We could perhaps 
understand the appeal of a remarkable movie like V for Vendetta with this background of a 
trend towards a panoptic social order. Based on the graphic novel by Alan Moore and David 
Lloyd, and directed by James McTeigue, the movie takes place in London in a near future 
dystopian, completely authoritarian and panoptic society. The movie tells the story of a 
masked and costumed freedom fighter in this police state, whose attire commemorates Guy 
Fawkes, who attempted to destroy the Houses of Parliament in London with a group of 
Catholic conspirators in 1605. 
4. Common root of the opposing reactions 
These two reactions at odds with each other nevertheless share a common outlook. Both 
their enthusiasm for the singularly liberating nature of this new future as cyber 
technophiles, and their Luddite resistance to its singularly fascistic and panoptic 
encirclement are similarly informed by the modernist worlding of the world and the binary 
opposition between (advanced) modern and (backward) traditional or simply between 
future/present and past. Whether seen as good or bad, it is agreed that cyberspace, virtual 
reality, and hypertext herald an otherness defined in terms of an altogether different and 
new future to be distinguished categorically from the existing space/reality/textuality. 
Within this framework, cyberspace, virtual reality, and hypertext are portrayed as signifiers 
of an altogether different and new future, and yet their otherness in a binary opposition is 
always and necessarily a "domestic other" whose otherness is not other to the binary 
structure of our knowledge, but one that is defined in its terms. Thus we always-already 
know what the other is all about. It is the binary opposite of what we know our world, and 
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ourselves, to be. Indeed we rely on this supplementary other to define our world and 
ourselves. For example, "they are traditional and backward, we are modern and advanced." 
Backwardness of the other, then is not an unknown that is then discovered, but it is 
projected from within the binary oppositional structure of what we already know. Similarly, 
virtual reality becomes a make-believe simulation, such as when student pilots "fly" on the 
ground, and not the “actual” reality of flying. It is by reference to this "real" reality that 
"virtual" reality assumes its immediately recognizable, hence domestic, identity as make-
believe, as not-quite- real. It is significant, I think, to recall at this point that Baudrillard's 
definition of simulacrum as a copy without an original, together with his depiction of the 
real as "not only what can be reproduced, but [as] that which is always already reproduced," 
is undermining precisely this binary opposition: "Whereas representation tries to absorb 
simulation by interpreting it as false representation, simulation envelops the whole edifice 
of representation as itself a simulacrum" (Baudrillard, 1983, p. 11). 
5. The difference that does not add-up 
If the otherness of cyberspace, virtual reality, and hypertext were radically other, on the 
other hand, if it were "wild," so to speak, and not "domesticated," I could not give a 
recognizable and familiar account of it in the given terms of the binary structure of my 
thinking. In that case, the other exceeds my thinking. The otherness of the other is other to 
my domesticated, oppositional other. Such alterity then requires another kind of response. It 
requires a rethinking, a transformation, a further becoming of how I know the other. Only 
then could we speak of "new paradigms" and "new concepts and theories," and not when we 
embrace the domestic "new" of the modernist binary. 
Furthermore, the difference between this "wild" other and the "domestic" other is not an 
external difference but a difference within the same word/term/concept: the other. 
Similarly, the differences between cyber and normal (?) space, virtual and actual (?) reality, 
hyper and ordinary (?) text also refer to a difference within. This difference does not refer us 
to the outside but is radical; it is at the root. This difference-within corresponds to the 
becoming of their being: to their becoming different and other to themselves. Hence, they do 
not have a complete, final, finished once-and-for-all being either as origin or as telos. The 
full presence of their being is always deferred in a ceaseless, an-archic becoming without an 
origin or telos. Hence, there is no original and stable reality, space, or text, to be nostalgic 
for, and to return to, after the "detour" of their alienation from their "real" selves. That 
"detour" is no detour with its sights set on a final return home to satisfy the second reaction, 
but, rather, a re-turn, that is, another change in direction, and another future.5 Therefore, our 
notions of space, reality, and text need to be complicated and rethought to accommodate 
what they seem to oppose: cyberspace, virtual reality, and hypertext. To put it differently, 
the attributes that we project onto cyberspace, virtual reality, and hypertext are already at 
work in conventional space, reality, and text.  
The latency and potentiality that excites us about cyberspace, virtual reality and hypertext 
are not their exclusive characteristics. At least since phenomenology, structuralism and 
poststructuralism, as well as psychoanalysis, we know that things are not self-identical and 
                                                 
5 In discussing metaphor, which "is determined by philosophy as a provisional loss of meaning...a 
certainly inevitable detour...with its sights set on...the circular reappropriation of literal, proper 
meaning," Jacques Derrida argues that "de-tour is a re-turn" (Derrida, 1982, p. 270). 
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self-coincident, and that there is a generative, irreducible difference within them. This 
difference assures that things always differ from, and defer, who or what they are. Who or 
what they are is never complete in any final sense, but always provisional, in becoming or in 
process, and always to-come, always to be completed. To indicate both the spatial and 
temporal aspect of this difference, Derrida (1982) has coined the term differance, spelled with 
an a (p. 1-27). This differance is what opens things to the non-determinability of the future 
and gives us hope as to the coming of the new. The new is thus based on a repetition, or 
rather iteration, that is repetition with difference: New and repetition together. New is never 
altogether new, but resides or comes out in/from the old. What ties repetition to the new is 
the incalculable excess that Derrida (2001) also calls the absolute and unconditional secret 
that can never be fully and finally revealed because it is always to-come (p. 57-59).   
Cyberspace, virtual reality, hypertext are not self- sufficient, self-referential entities. Rather, 
they are relative and differential concepts that owe their status as cyber-, virtual-, and 
hyper- to a reference to and a comparison with the unqualified space, reality, and text. The 
qualifying adjectives cyber, virtual, and hyper define them clearly as the products of a 
technological intervention involving miniaturized computer chips, digitalization of media 
products, computer hardware and software, fiber optic and other cables, satellite 
communication networks, Internet, the world wide web, and the like. However, it would be 
misleading to think that the unqualified space, reality, and text are not the products of 
technological interventions. The ones we designate as traditional space, reality, and text are, 
indeed, the outcome of older technological interventions that we have grown accustomed to, 
ones that we no longer see as technological, but as given conditions of everyday operations 
of the real (Grosz, 1997, p. 109). The border between the two is not sustainable but porous 
and mobile. This does not mean that they are not different, but that their difference is not 
external and categorical but inter-implicational.  
6. Conclusion 
What excites and scares us about cyberspace, virtual reality, and hypertext is their obvious 
incompleteness. This makes them prone to imaginary and projected futures, and suitable for 
dreams, hopes, and fears regarding what is yet to come. Our excitement, for instance, comes 
from the idea of an indeterminate, unspecifiable, and open-ended future, and the 
precedence of futurity over past and present. But, as Elizabeth Grosz points out, we did not 
have to wait for the computer screen, the Internet, and the web to enter virtual space and its 
domain of latency and potentiality. "We live in its shadow more or less constantly" (Grosz, 
1997, p. 111). As the oxymorons virtual reality, cyberspace, and hypertext imply, virtuality 
already resides in reality, and space, and the characteristics attributed to hypertext are 
already at work in the ordinary, unqualified text.  
The real/space/text are always open to the future, that is to say, open to potentialities and 
(re)articulations or (re)inscriptions other than those that are realized at the present, and the 
non-sequential, non-hierarchical attributes of hypertext are already found in the unqualified 
text. We could say that virtual reality/cyberspace/hypertext derive their seductive power 
from this possibility of the real/space/text becoming other than themselves. Therefore, it 
should not surprise us too much that even after introducing hypertext in terms of a 
"paradigm shift," a "revolution in human thought," and a "new episteme abandoning the 
old," that George Landow should refer to the traditional "scholarly article" in the humanities 
or physical sciences as the perfect embodiment of hypertext (1997, p. 4) (Fig. 2). 
www.intechopen.com
The Otherness of Cyberspace, Virtual Reality and Hypertext 
 
645 
 
Fig. 2. Landow upholds the traditional scholarly article (example on right) as the perfect 
embodiment of hypertext. 
The interimplication of both sides of our opposition virtual reality/cyberspace/hypertext 
versus reality/space/text calls on us not to be content with, say, the domesticated otherness 
of the former as the representative of the emergent future as opposed to the latter's stagnant 
traditionality, but rather to rethink the latter to accommodate the excluded features 
attributed to the former. In an example of such rethinking, Donna Haraway argues that the 
figure of the cyborg is our ontology, that is to say, it does not belong to a future-yet-to-come, 
but to the always-already here and now (Haraway, 2000, p. 292). Her thesis, thus, involves a 
rethinking, a retranscription, and a reformulation of our ontology. Moreover, the 
deconstruction of the modernist teleology means that there is no predetermined teleological 
destiny inscribed in these new technologies either as a powerful force of liberation or as 
fascistic and panoptic encirclement, but, rather, that they imply the possibility of both—
which is to say that they are like the old technologies in this respect as well. Therefore, our 
active participation in the orientation and reweaving of the textile fabric of the cyberspace 
could mean the difference between one or the other.  
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